The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of military training on earnings for young men in Sweden. The analysis is based on the cohort of men born in 1973. The 1973 cohort was conscripted during a time of rapid change in the Swedish security policy and substantial cutdowns of the armed forces. As a consequence, a relatively large part of the cohort was assigned a service category after the enlistment test but one third of these individuals were never conscripted. We argue that these organizational changes along with the set of important background variables that are available makes it possible to rely on selection on observables.
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Introduction
The armed forces are often referred to as a good place to start off since military training and experience may foster or signal personal traits such as leadership ability and perseverance.
However, the effect of military experience on labor market outcomes is ambiguous. Second World War veterans have been found to experience positive wage premiums compared to non-veterans while the wage premium for Vietnam veterans have been negative (see, e.g. Rosen and Taubman, 1982, and Berger and Hirsch, 1983) . One explanation that has been put forth is that the different returns to military experience are due to war specific circumstances, e.g. the public opinion, or differences in the skills and experiences that are obtained during service. More resent research has found that differences in subsequent labor market outcomes to a large extent can be explained by the selection process into the armed forces. For example, by utilizing the fact that the U.S. recruitment in the conscription system during World War II was based on the date of birth, Angrist (1998) shows that veterans from World War II did not earn more that non-veterans.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze to what extent Swedish military training
is rewarded on the labor market. Sweden has a conscription system meaning that all men in Sweden are obliged to attend a military enlistment test and in the end military training.
1 The study differs from many of the earlier studies as it concerns military training in peacetime and not military experience from war or international peacekeeping missions. Earlier literature has
shown that the selection problem is crucial to handle in order to identify the effect of military training. The research strategy in this paper for identifying the training effect is built on two foundations. Firstly, in the post-cold war era the Swedish defense transformed from an invasion defense that required a large part of every cohort to be conscripted, to a relatively small and highly technological organization with the main aim to participate in international peacekeeping missions. During the re-formation of the military defense a large number of individuals were assigned a service category after the enlistment test but were not conscripted due to extensive cut-downs and regiment closures. In our sample, that is restricted to Swedish men born in 1973 having Swedish born parents, approximately 35,000 individuals were assigned a service category. However, only 24,000 were finally conscripted, meaning that we have a control group of 11,000 individuals.
Secondly, the empirical analysis is based on a wide range of individual characteristics that can be linked to individual earning statistics. Although our control group is not selected on individual characteristics at the time of the enlistment test, the rich data set is important since a selection problem may arise in the process of regiment closedowns. During the transformation to a more highly technological defense requiring fewer conscripts, less advanced units were more likely to face cut-downs at the same time as these units may have required conscripts with lower "skill profile". Since we have access to the same information concerning individual characteristics as the National Service Administration, relying on selection on observables should be enough to identify the training effect (see Heckman and Robb, 1985 , for a discussion). The data set contains a wide range of individual characteristics, e.g. parental characteristics, education levels, and test scores, all of which can be linked to individual earnings statistics. We also control for how well the individuals performed during military training since we have access to the grades given after military training.
Regression is our main approach but we also conduct matching to check the robustness of the regression results. In the empirical analysis we have constructed three subsamples with respect to the level of command, which are strongly correlated with the length of the training period. The private category has the shortest training period of approximately seven months. The squad leader category does ten months of training and the platoon leader category 15 months.
The paper contributes to the literature for (at least) two reasons. First, it focuses solely on training and not military experience during wartime or international peacekeeping missions. Second, the paper takes advantage of the transformation of the armed forces in the post cold war era. Furthermore, the results are of importance for the present debate concerning the military personnel recruitment in Sweden. The compulsive part of the Swedish conscription system has been strongly criticized in the post cold war era. Although it is in the interest of the armed forces that the conscripted men are motivated for the task, the compulsory element of the conscription system is evident since young men that refuse to be conscripted can still be sentenced to imprisonment. In this context, it is of interest to have knowledge of the impact that military service has on the individuals' labor market outcomes.
The main result is that military training has a positive effect on earnings for the private category. Furthermore, the positive effect is dependent upon the educational level; individuals with low education benefit the most from participating in military training. 2 When applying regression analysis, some evidence is also found of a positive earnings effect for the squad leaders that subsequently do not obtain high education. However, this effect is not present when matching is conducted. We do not find any evidence that military training has an impact on earnings for individuals drafted for the platoon leader category.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, a review of earlier comparable literature is presented. In section 3, we discuss our research strategy and data, and also compare the control group with the conscripted in different dimensions. Section 4 contains the empirical model. The results are presented in section 5, and section 6 concludes.
Earlier literature
There is an extensive literature dealing with the impact that military training and experience have on individuals' earnings and employment. Most studies are based on U.S. data but they do not give a unanimous picture of the effect of military training and experience on labor market outcomes. From an economic perspective the civilian return of military service can be analyzed within two traditional frameworks of labor economics: the human capital hypothesis and the screening hypothesis. According to the former, civilian return of military service is a result of the transferability of skills between military service and the civilian sector. The screening hypothesis, on the other hand, highlights that even if the military service does not improve any skills useable in the civilian sector, the service as such provides information about personal characteristics that will affect the post service civilian earning and employment positively or negatively. From an empirical point of view it is of course difficult to separate these effects.
A number of studies find that veterans from World War II experienced positive wage premiums compared to non-veterans, while Vietnam veterans were not rewarded for their military experience (see e.g. Rosen and Taubman, 1982, and Berger and Hirsch, 1983 Goldberg and Warner, 1987) . Bryant and Wilhite (1990) find evidence that military training has a positive effect on wages, while the length of the military career affects wages in the civil life negatively.
A general methodological problem that is present in many studies is the selection process into the armed forces. Firstly, a conscription system implies a screening process where the most suitable men are chosen for a specific service. Secondly, voluntary enrolment implies that individuals are self-selected into the armed forces. In both cases, it is likely that unobserved heterogeneity leads to comparisons that may be befouled with selection bias. The antecedent empirical studies typically disregarded the selection problem; later studies have in line with the return-to-schooling literature tried to the handle selection bias.
The development of methods for handling self-selection has also contributed with new insights regarding the impact of military experience on labor market outcomes. veterans who served in the early 1980´s. In this study Angrist applied two strategies for dealing with selection. Firstly, he compared enlisted with those applicants who did not enlist.
The second strategy was to use an instrumental variable method based on an error in the scoring of exams during screening. Angrist found that employment rates after military services were higher for veterans. The increase in civilian earning was small for nonwhites and white veterans experienced a negative effect of military services on earnings.
Research strategy and data
The empirical analysis in this study is based on the cohort of men born in 1973 and residing in 
Data and control groups
Due to the change in the Swedish security policy and the cut downs of the armed forces, a relatively large share of the cohort was assigned a service category but was never conscripted, i.e. these individuals did not start the military training. In Table 1 men that were assigned a service category, only about 24,000 were conscripted. This means that we have a control group of approximately 11,000 men. 
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For our purposes it is important to compare the characteristics of the conscripted group with the control group (assigned a service but not conscripted). The groups are compared with respect to the psychological ability and cognitive ability that are evaluated at the enlistment test; these indicators are important determinants for the assignment of service category. 7 For the squad leader and platoon leader categories we have also compared the evaluation of leadership ability. The leadership ability is evaluated if the individual scoring five or higher on the cognitive test. We have not presented the mean values of the leadership ability for the private category since a large share of the group has not been evaluated.
Since the cohort was conscripted during a time of extensive reformation of the armed forces, we argue that it is reasonable to consider the control group as randomized. If the consequences of the military cut-downs and closedowns of regiments were fully anticipated, we would expect the armed forces to have taken advantage of the option to choose the most suitable men for the military services. 8 In this case we should observe substantial differences between the groups. 9 As was mentioned earlier, a possible source of selection may be found in the process of regiment closedowns. Less advanced units may have 7 We have also access to the grade point average (GPA) from the 9 th year of compulsory school. However, we do not consider the GPA in the analysis since it is highly correlated with the cognitive test score. If GPA is used in the empirical analysis instead of the cognitive test score, the main results are not altered. 8 Although we have access to a wide range of individual characteristics, we cannot rule out that the military defence has access to information (individual characteristics) that is not available to us. Such unobserved characteristics (for the researcher) may origin from the individuals' preferences for military services. However, we cannot find any reasonable argument that strong preferences for the armed forces should be correlated with higher productivity in the civil life. For the platoon leader category, where the individual's assent is required, it
is not reasonable to argue that the conscript group is more motivated than the control group. Preferences for the military defence may also affect some of the control variables. A person with an aversion to military training might try to underachieve during the tests. In this case, the true ability of the control group is actually higher and earnings effect of completing military training will be underestimated.
9 For later cohorts, the group of conscripts is certainly not randomised since the military defence has adapted to the new security policy environment. One example of the adaptive process is the so-called education reserve that was implemented after the 1992 defence resolution. One implication of the reserve was that individuals were tested and afterwards placed in the reserve without an assignment of a service category. These individuals were seen as a possible source of future conscripts if new security policy threats would emerge. However, 98 percent of the 1973 cohort was tested prior to the implementation of the education reserve so the risk of selection bias stemming from this source seems remote.
required conscripts with lower "skill profile", these units were more likely to face cut-downs.
However, since we have the same information as the National Service Administration, relying on selection on observables should be enough.
Before examining the characteristics of the conscripts and the control group, an interesting question is how the characteristics of these two groups compares to the share of the cohort that have been tested but have not been assigned a service category. As can be seen from In Tables 3 through 8 descriptive statistics are presented for the private category, the squad leader category, and the platoon leader category. In Tables 3 and 4 descriptive statistics for the individuals with a private category assignment are presented; Table 3 contains the group that have not been conscripted and Some differences can be observed although they are relatively small. The evaluation of psychological ability and the score from the cognitive enlistment test is somewhat higher in the conscripted group. In Tables 5 and 6 , descriptive statistics can be found for squad leaders.
The group of squad leaders who has fulfilled their services is almost three times larger than the control group. As can be seen from the table, there are very small differences between the two groups. The test of cognitive skills is marginally higher in the control group. Turning to the platoon leader category (Tables 7 and 8) there are very small differences in characteristics between the groups. It is important to note that an individual cannot be conscripted as a platoon leader on a compulsory basis. The individual's assent is required for this service category. 
Empirical model
Regression approach
The natural logarithm of earnings at the age of 30 is regressed on parental characteristics, Variable definitions are presented in Table 9 and descriptive statistics are presented in Table A1 
Matching approach 12
Both the regression technique and the matching approach rely on the conditional mean independence assumption. However, while regression analysis also rest on an additional assumption that conditioning linearly will remove the selection bias, matching solves the selection problem by either non-parametric or semi-parametric methods. An additional difference between the two methods is that when obtaining the regression estimates, no care is taken to ensure that comparable observations exist.
A probit model is estimated as a first step in the matching procedure. Based on the probit model, matching is carried out on the resulting propensity score. The probit model is fitted by including the following variables; a constant, a set of dummy variables capturing the region of residence when undergoing the military enlistment test, parental income, parental education, test score on the psychological ability evaluation, test score on the cognitive ability evaluation, and score on the leadership ability test (not included for the private category). Two different matching methods are used; nearest neighbor matching and kernel matching using kernel type Epanechnikov. Nearest neighbor matching is carried out with replacement using one respectively four neighbors. The Epanechnikov approach is implemented using a bandwidth of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. The effect in focus in both the kernel and nearest neighbor strategy is the average treatment effect on the treated. Parental income measured as the average earning of the mother and father for the years 1990-1992.
FamEdu i
The highest education level obtained by the mother or the father (compulsory school, vocational training, three years of upper secondary school, less than two years of post secondary schooling, three years or more of post secondary schooling).
Married i
Indicates that the individual is married in 2003.
Unempl
Unemployment rate in the municipality where the individual is residing in 2003.
County
Dummy variable indicating the county where the individual is residing the year the enlistment test is conducted.
LowEdu i
The variable indicates that three years of upper secondary school is the highest education level.
HighEdu i
The variable indicates that university education is the highest education level.
Experience i
The number of years since the highest education was obtained. Experience^2 i The squared number of years since the highest education was obtained.
Cogn i
A variable ranking the individuals score on the cognitive test in the military enlistment test. The measure range from 1-9 and 5 is the average value for the population. 1 is low ability and 9 is high ability.
PsAbility i
A measure of psychological ability that is evaluated at the enlistment test by psychologists. The measure range from 1-9 and 5 is the average value for the population. 1 is low ability and 9 is high ability.
Leader i
A measure of leadership ability that is evaluated at the enlistment test by psychologists. The measure range from 1-9 and 5 is the average value for the population. The evaluation is only conducted if the individual receives a score above average on the cognitive test. 1 is low ability and 9 is high ability.
Mil i
A variable taking the value one if the individual have done military services, zero otherwise.
Mil_Gr i
An interaction variable between Mil and the average grade received after military service. The average grade comprises three assessments: manners, qualification for the position, and knowledge and skills. The assessment should not be compared for different positions or level of commands, i.e. a grade 10-7-7 which is generally seen as a good grade, is not comparable between a private category and squad leader. As a point if reference, the grade 10-7-7 is required for service in international missions or admission to military academy.
Mil_LowEdu i An interaction variable between completed military training and low education level
Mil_HighEdu i An interaction variable between completed military training and high education level. Note: The assessment of manners is generally expected to be graded ten. A grade lower than ten is observed in less than one percent for the present cohort, which might be seen as a negative signal on the labor market. In the empirical analysis we have also estimated models where a dummy variable is added for the cases where the grade for manners is lower than ten, however, no significant effect of the variable was found.
Results
The ordinary least square estimates for all three categories are presented separately in Tables   10-12 Turning to the results for the private category in Table 10 , the dummy variable for military training has a positive and significant effect in column one. Thus, when all individuals in the category are included, regardless of educational level, an earnings effect of military training of approximately 2.3 percent is indicated.
14 Adding the interaction between high educational level and completed military training, see column two, reveals that the positive effect stems from the low educational group. The effect of completing military training is 3.5 percent for the low educational group but 4.1 percent lower for the high 13 In Tables A2-A4 in the appendix the sensitivity of the results to the conditioning on covariates that are determined after the military training is undertaken, i.e. experience, experience squared, educational level, marriage and local unemployment are excluded. This is particularly interesting for the low educational group.
One reason for studying might be a weak labor market position. Thus, one might suspect that individuals obtaining their highest educational level (still defined as low) later to be negatively selected. Most of the main results are not altered.
educational group. Both parameters are significant at the one percent level. Running separate regressions on each of the educational groups strengthens the conclusion that the earnings effect differ between the educational groups; column three indicates an earnings premium of 3.7 percent for individuals with low education and an insignificant loss of 0.5 percent for the high educational group. The squad leaders show a similar pattern as the private category. Column one in Table 11 shows that there is a 2.0 percent earnings effect for completing military training. The earnings effect is significant at the ten percent level. Column two indicates that the effect is larger for the low educational group, 3.8 percent, a parameter estimate significant at the five percent level. However, column two also shows that there are no significant difference in the earnings effect between the educational groups, although, the sign of the interaction indicates lower returns for individuals with more education. When separate regressions are run on each of the educational groups, the message concerning educational group differences in the earnings effect is stronger. Column three indicates that the earnings effect is 4.3 percent for the low educational group (significant at the 5 percent level), whereas no significant effect is found for the high educational group. Turning to the last category, platoon leaders, in Table 12 , no significant earnings effects of military training are found. If only looking at the magnitude of the parameters the pattern is the same as before, i.e. the low educational group benefits from training, while the effect for the high educational group is around zero.
To sum up; the results indicate that there are positive earnings effects of serving in the private or squad leader category for individuals that subsequently do not obtain a high educational level. Thus, it seems as if some desirable skills are learned in the military, alternatively that having served signals desirable characteristics, and that these skills/characteristics are valued on the labor market.
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We have also run regressions when including the grade from military training.
In Table 13 we display the results for the separate regressions on high and low educational groups in the three categories. It is clear that the performance during training matters, the estimate of the military grade is positive and significant in all sub groups. For the low (high) educational group in the private category, the cut-off point is a mean grade of 6.84 (8.21), e.g. the grade 10-5-5 (10-7-7) is an example of the highest grade below the cut-off point.
Approximately 5 (53) percent of the individuals in the private category have an average grade that is below the cut-off point.
For the squad leader category, the cut-off point is 6.85 for the low educational group and 7.69 for the high educational group. In the low (high) educational group roughly 4 (21) percent of the individuals have an average grade that is below the cut-off point. Finally, the cut-off point in the platoon leader category is 6.44 (8.49) for the low (high) educational group. The fraction of individuals below the cut-off points is around 2 percent for the low educational group and 49 percent for the high educational group. A point of reference in this discussion is that the minimum requirement for recruitment to international peacekeeping missions is 10-7-7. It is important to note that the grades are not comparable between the different groups since they reflect the skills and abilities for a specific service category. It is not clear how to interpret the effect of military grades. One possible interpretation is that the grade reflects the amount of human capital acquired during the military service, i.e. a human capital interpretation. Another, equally plausible, explanation is that individuals reveal their capacities during the training (beyond what is captured in the enlistment tests) and that these capacities are valued on the labor market. With the data at hand we cannot separate the two effects.
Regression vs. Matching
As mentioned above, the selection on observables strategy can be implemented either by regression or matching. In this subsection, the robustness of the regression results to the alternative approach will be studied. Table 14 reports the estimated earnings effect using regression (previously displayed in the first, third and fourth columns in Tables 10-12) and various matching procedures. The matching estimates reported are based on nearest neighbor matching with replacement (1 respectively 4 neighbors) and matching using kernel type Epanechnikov (bandwidth 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10). In all of the matching procedures a probit model was fitted to obtain the propensity score. Only a handful of the observations are off support in any of the sub groups when matching is carried out. The reported effect is the average treatment effect on the treated. Table A2 in the appendix we can see that regressions using only the variables included in the matching approach show the same tendency as the matching estimates. The variables that seem to drive this are experience and experience squared. When using a regression approach and including only variables used in the matching, the positive earnings effect when all individuals are included regardless of educational level disappear. However, the positive and significant effect remains for the low educational group.
Turning to the results for the squad leader category, we see that no significant earnings effects are found in any of the groups (All, LowEduc or HighEduc). Again the most important difference, apart from the significance levels, is the high educational group. Just as for the private category, the estimate obtained for this group using regression is higher than all of the matching estimates. Reported in Table A3 in the appendix are results from regressions using only the variables included in the matching approach. Again, it is clear that the estimates for the high educational group is lower (and similar in magnitude to the matching estimates) if the full specification is used instead of leaving out covariates not included in the matching. For the low educational group the estimates using nearest neighbor matching is similar in magnitude (however insignificant) to the once obtained from regression, while the kernel approach result in somewhat smaller estimates.
Finally, no significant results are found for the platoon leader category using the matching strategy, results displayed in Table 14 . If looking at the magnitudes of the estimates, the pattern from the regression analysis is repeated. Results when not including other variables than used in the matching procedure are displayed in Table A4 in the appendix.
To summarise, the conclusion that there is an earnings effect for individuals serving in the private category and subsequently not obtain a high educational level is strengthened by the results obtained using matching. No other significant earnings effects are found when implementing the selection on observables strategy.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of military training on annual earnings for men at the age of 30. The analysis is based on the cohort of men born in 1973 and residing in Sweden on December 31, 1990. In order to avoid discrimination issues we only consider men with Swedish born parents.
The 1973 cohort was enlisted during a period when the armed forces experienced considerable cut-downs. As a consequence a relatively large share of the cohort was assigned a service category but was not conscripted. We argue that the change in the Swedish security policy offers an exogenous shift that can be used for identification of the training effect. Moreover, given that we have access to test results from the enlistment test as well as other important background variables we feel confident that relying on a selection on observables strategy is reasonable. Regression is our main approach but we also check the sensitivity of our results by implementing a matching strategy.
The empirical analysis is based on three sub-samples, representing different levels of command and different length of the training period (private, squad leader, platoon leader). Separate analyses are also carried out on groups of individuals with different educational levels. The regression results indicate that military training has a positive effect on earnings at the age of 30 for individuals serving in the private category and not subsequently obtaining higher education. This result is repeated when implementing a matching strategy. There may be several explanations to this result. One is that military training enhances skills and abilities that are rewarded only for some positions on the labor market, e.g. the tendency to follow instructions and orders may be highly rewarded in some sectors. Another explanation is that military training can be seen as a marginal post-secondary education, and the effect of this training is overridden by university education. When relying on regression analysis, a positive and significant effect on the group serving as squad leaders is also found. However, the significance of this result disappears when the matching strategy with foreign background. Finally, it is important to note that the armed forces today still rely on the conscription system although a standing army is not as remote as it was during the cold war era. The share of the cohort that is drafted today is very small and international peace keeping missions after completed training are relatively common. An interesting question is how military training and experience from international missions are rewarded on the labor market for cohorts that are drafted in later years. 
